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Abstract
We use cross–country observations on the effects of population
growth to show why differences in rates of growth in working age
population may be a key to understanding differences in economic
performance across industrialized countries over the period 1975–97
versus 1960–74. In particular, we argue that countries with lower
rates of adult population growth have adopted new capital intensive
technologies more quickly than their high population growth coun-
terparts, therefore allowing them to reduce their work–time without
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I Introduction
Economic performance among industrialized countries over the last decades
of the twentieth century has been puzzling on several dimensions. In partic-
ular, economic outcomes between this set of countries have differed consider-
ably over this period, both in terms of output–per–worker and employment
rates, even though it seems most likely that the same technological forces
have affected all of them. It is therefore natural to ask why this diversity
has come about? The object of the paper is to argue that differences in the
rate of growth of the working age population –which we will refer to as the
adult population – may be a key to understanding this puzzle. In particular,
we will show how focusing on effects of differential rates of adult popula-
tion growth across industrialized countries can give insight with respect to
both the nature of the recent technological change and to the reasons why
countries have adjusted differently to this change.
The first part of this paper motivates our analysis by presenting a series of
cross–country regressions which relate different measures of economic per-
formance among industrialized countries to rates of adult population growth
(individuals aged between 15 and 64). As we will show, there has been a
rather drastic change in nature of such relationships over the period 1975–97
versus the period 1960–1974. In particular, over the earlier period (1960–
74), the data do not indicate any systematic links between adult population
growth and the growth of either output–per–adult, output–per–worker or
employment–per–adult. This finding is rather unsurprising and consistent
with common perceptions. However, there has been a radical change over
the more recent period. In effect, over the period 1975–97, we find that adult
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population growth has exhibited a very large and systematic correlation with
economic performance. For example, we show that countries with lower rates
of adult population growth had much better growth performance in output–
per–worker than high population growth countries, a lower performance in
employment–per–adult and similar performance in output–per–adult. More-
over, we show that these results are not due to changes in the age structure
of the population, but instead appear to be driven primarily by differences
in the rate of growth of the adult population.
Our approach in the main body of the paper is to illustrate why these cross-
country observations are suggestive of a major technological change which fa-
vors accumulable factors. To this end, we extend a Solow–type growth model
in two directions. First, we introduce the possibility of a radical technologi-
cal change in the form of the arrival and the dissemination of an alternative
means of production. This type of technological change is meant to cap-
ture ideas emphasized in the General Purpose Technology (GPT) literature
(see e.g. Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995)), whereby large technological
changes are viewed as offering an entirely new means of producing goods
as opposed to coming simply in the form of labor augmenting technological
change. Secondly, we endow households with neo–classical preferences be-
tween consumption and leisure (as in the business cycle literature) in order
examine whether such structure of preferences can reconcile the observed
differential behavior of output–per–adult versus output–per–worker — and
hence, employment–per–adult — over the recent period.
Using this model, we show why countries with different rates of adult pop-
ulation growth are likely to adjust differently to a common technological
change, in terms of both output–per–worker and employment–per–adult. A
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central aspect of the paper is to show that our model can both explain the
qualitative features of the data, and quantitatively replicate the observed
changes in importance of adult population growth in the cross–country re-
gressions. For example, we illustrate how radical technological change can
generate cross–country differences in the growth of employment–per-adult
and output–per–worker of the order observed in the data. Overall, we argue
that our model provides an explanation to the differential economic experi-
ences of industrialized countries since the mid–seventies which is based on
demographic factors as opposed to the more common explanation based on
institutional factors.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we discuss a
series of cross–country regressions linking measures of economic performance
to population growth. In section 3, we present a simple growth model where
we allow technological change to arrive in both the form labor augmenting
progress and in the form of increased access to a alternative means of pro-
ducing goods. In section 4, we derive the main theoretical implications of
the model. In particular, we show why the increased access to a more capital
intensive production process can cause economic outcomes across countries
to differ simply due to differences in their rates of growth in the working age
population. We then document the extent to which our model is capable of
quantitatively replicating the data. Finally, a last section offers concluding
comments.
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II Economic Performance and Population Growth:
Some Intriguing Observations
In this section, we report a set of cross–country regression relating three
measures of economic performance — growth in output–per–adult, growth
in output–per–worker and the change in employment–per–adult — to the rate
of growth of the adult population and other controls. We focus exclusively
on the experiences of the richest industrialized countries (countries with per–
adult–income in 1985 above 10,000 US$) since it is the set of countries for
which assuming common access to technological opportunities appears most
plausible. The 18 countries forming our sample are Australia, Austria, Bel-
gium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, New–Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom
and the United States.1 The data are taken from OECD statistical com-
pendium 1999 unless indicated otherwise.
The main observation that we want to emphasize in these data is that the
relationships between economic performance and adult population growth
has changed quite drastically over the period 1975–1997 relative to the period
1960–74, and that the change is surprising both in size and direction. In
particular, over the period 1975–97, we find a systematic and large effect of
adult population growth on output–per–worker and workers–per–adult that
was not apparent in the earlier period.2 In contrast, we find that the behavior
of output–per–adult has been more stable.
1It is quite natural to cut the sample of countries at the level of 10,000 US$ since in
1985 this is precisely where there is a large break in the data. For example, the next
richest countries have per adult incomes below 7,500US$.
2This is especially surprising given that, from a priori reasoning and due to the greater
openness of economies, one would most likely have expected the effects of population
growth on economic performance to have decreased over time not increased.
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The empirical evidence supporting this view is provided in Table 1, which
reports our main estimation results. Panel A in the table contains results
associated with the period 1960–74, while the panels B and C give results for
the period 1975–97. Columns 1, 3 and 5 in Table 1 report results where the
dependent variable is respectively the yearly growth3 in GDP–per–adult, the
yearly growth in GDP–per–worker and the yearly change of the employment–
to–adult population ratio. Recall that we are defining adults here as individ-
uals aged between 15 and 64. Each of these variables is then regressed on two
variables: the yearly growth rate of population aged 15–64 (denoted A-Pop.
Gr) and the initial (log) level of GDP–per–adult in the initial year (expressed
in US$) —i.e. GDP–per–capita in either 1960 or 1975.4 This specification
can be derived from a standard growth model (see e.g. Solow (1956)) when
we assume that countries have similar technology and preferences, but differ
only with respect to their rates of population growth. In columns 2, 4 and 6
of each panel, we add as regressor the countries average investment–to–GDP
ratio over the period5 and two dummy variables that are meant to capture
broad institutional differences across countries. The first dummy variable
equals 1 if the country is predominately an Anglo-Saxon country6, and the
3In all cases, the yearly growth rate is calculated as to the average growth rate over
the period. In the case of Germany, due to unification, yearly averages are calculated for
West–Germany only and are restricted to the period 1975–91 instead of 1975–97. We have
exploited longer series for West–Germany, and found our results to be unaffected.
4For the 1960–74 sample, we use Barro and Sala-i-Martin measure of GDP–per–capita
in 1960 for initial values (See Table 10.1 in Barro Sala-i-Martin (1995)). For the 1975–97
sample, we update this measure using respectively the observed growth in GDP–per–adult
and per–worker over the period 1960–74.
5The investment–to–GDP ratios are taken from the Heston and Summers data set and
include both private and public investments. We chose to use the Heston and Summers’
investment ratio to allow our results to be easily compared with the growth regression
literature. However, this choice has forced us to calculate the average investment rate
over the later period using data only up to 1992.
6These are Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United
States
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second dummy variable equals 1 for the three Scandinavian countries7.
The main pattern of results in panels A and B of Table 1 is rather clear.
Over the period 1960–74, adult population growth is found to exert only
a small and insignificant effect on all three measures of economic perfor-
mance — GDP–per–adult, GDP–per–worker and employment rate — and,
for both output measures, there is strong evidence of convergence (approx.
4% per year), which is consistent with standard growth theory. The pat-
tern over the 1975–97 is different and more intriguing. First note that the
behavior of output–per–adult and output–per–worker diverges in terms of
their relationship with adult population growth (denoted A-Pop. Gr.). Sec-
ond, note that this divergence is entirely due to a change in the behavior of
output–per–worker in the second period relative to the first, since the be-
havior of output–per–adult is rather unchanged. Accordingly, we also see
the emergence of a significant positive effect of adult population growth on
employment rates over the later period. In effect, our point estimates in
panel B suggest that a country with a yearly rate of adult population growth
of 1% greater than the average experienced a poorer growth in output–per–
worker of approximately 1% per year. This is actually a huge effect as, when
compounded over the 22 years of the sample, it corresponds to a difference
of 25% in labor productivity. It is worth noting that the pattern described
above is hardly affected by whether we include dummy variables for Anglo–
Saxon and Scandinavian countries, and whether or not we include average
investment rates. Furthermore, it is worth emphasizing that the appearance
of a change in both the output–per–worker relationship and the employment
rate relationship between the 1960–74 period versus the 1975–97 period are
statistically significant. In fact, we tested and could reject at the 5% level
7These are Denmark, Norway and Sweden
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Table 1: Cross–country Regressions
Dep. Var. % ∆(Y/A) % ∆(Y/L) % ∆(L/A)
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Panel A: 1960–74
A-Pop. Gr. -0.205 -0.060 -0.312 -0.279 0.104 0.212
(0.170) (0.025) (0.221) ( 0.297) (0.139) (0.154)
Init. (Y/N) -0.037 -0.034 -0.043 -0.036 0.005 0.001
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.003)
I/Y and Dum. No Yes No Yes No Yes
R2 0.84 0.86 0.81 0.86 0.19 0.61
Panel B: 1975–97
A-Pop. Gr. -0.363 -0.288 -0.989 -1.217 0.617 0.918
(0.288) (0.398) (0.325) ( 0.461) (0.242) (0.367)
Init. (Y/N) -0.023 -0.024 -0.019 -0.019 -0.003 -0.005
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.007) (0.008)
I/Y and Dum. No Yes No Yes No Yes
R2 0.41 0.56 0.50 0.61 0.31 0.38
Panel C:1975–97
IV WLS IV WLS IV WLS
A-Pop. Gr. -0.472 0.194 -1.093 -0.835 0.614 1.015
(0.326) (0.340) (0.383) ( 0.339) (0.293) (0.363)
Init. (Y/N) -0.023 -0.023 -0.019 -0.021 -0.003 -0.002
(0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
I/Y and Dum. No No No No No No
R2 0.94 0.92 0.58
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. Y/A: Output-per-adult.
Y/L: Output-per-worker. L/A: Employement rate (workers-per-
adult).
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the hypothesis that the coefficients in these regressions are stable over the
two samples.
We also explored the robustness of our results with respect to the inclusion
of other variables such as measures of human capital. Although not reported
here, we found the patterns described in Table 1 to be robust to controlling for
human capital differences across countries as measured either by the average
number of years of education or by the school enrollment rates.8
Given this rather striking observation with respect to the behavior of GDP–
per–worker and the employment rate over the period 1975–97 versus the
period 1960–74 — especially the increased importance of adult population
growth — it is relevant to further explore the robustness of this observation.
To this end, in panel C of Table 1, we report regressions using an instru-
mental variable (IV) strategy and using weighted least squares (WLS). In
Columns 1, 3 and 5 of panel C, we used adult population growth over the
period 1960–74 as an instrument for adult population growth over the pe-
riod 1975–97. This instrumental variable strategy has the attractive feature
of countering possible biases due to an endogenous response of population
growth — especially immigration — to contemporaneous developments in the
economy. As can be seen in panel C, our estimates for the period 1975–97 are
essentially unaffected by this instrumental variable strategy suggesting that
the endogeneity of adult population growth in unlikely to be an important
problem over such a short period. In Columns 2, 4 and 6 of Panel C, we use
the square root of active population in 1975 to weight observations. As can
be seen, the effect of weighting our observations has again very little effect
on our estimates.
8These omitted results are available from the authors upon request.
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Table 2: Cross–country Regressions, Controlling for Age Structure
Dep. Var. % ∆(Y/A) % ∆(Y/L) % ∆(L/A)
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Panel A: 1960–74
A-Pop. Gr. 0.396 -0.138 0.280 -0.386 0.115 0.240
(0.582) (0.257) (0.686) ( 0.304) (0.368) (0.171)
Init. (Y/N) -0.032 -0.033 -0.033 -0.034 0.001 0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004)
%∆ C
C+A+E
0.024 – 0.027 – -0.003 –
(0.032) (0.037) (0.020)
%∆ E
C+A+E
0.040 – 0.054 – -0.013 –
(0.043) (0.050) (0.027)
C-Pop. Gr – 0.151 – 0.130 – 0.021
(0.206) (0.243) (0.136)
E-Pop. Gr. – 0.645 – 0.827 – -0.162
(0.471) (0.558) (0.313)
I/Y and Dum. yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.89 0.63 0.64
Panel B: 1975–97
A-Pop. Gr. -0.322 -0.253 -1.208 -1.240 0.875 0.973
(0.447) (0.484) (0.518) ( 0.558) (0.407) (0.441)
Init. (Y/N) -0.024 -0.024 -0.021 -0.021 -0.003 -0.003
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009)
%∆ C
c+A+E
-0.004 – 0.004 – -0.009 –
(0.018) (0.020) (0.016)
%∆ E
C+T+E
-0.003 – -0.002 – -0.001 –
(0.014) (0.016) (0.013)
C-Pop. Gr – -0.030 – 0.097 – -0.123
(0.290) (0.335) (0.264)
E-Pop. Gr. – -0.034 – -0.052 – -0.019
(0.251) (0.289) (0.229)
I/Y and Dum. yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.56 0.56 0.62 0.61 0.40 0.40
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis.Y/A: Output-per-adult. Y/L:
Output-per-worker. L/A: Employement rate (workers-per-adult)
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Another possibility we want to explore is whether the effects we observed
in Table 1 are likely driven by differences in the rate of growth of the adult
population or whether instead they may mainly reflect different changes in
the age structure of the population. For example, one may expect the adult
employment rate to be influenced by changes in the population of children
(individuals less that 15) or in the population of elderly (individuals more
than 64). To address this issue, we consider two sets of additional regressors
that capture changes in the age structure. The first set is composed of (i) the
percentage change in the ratio of the child population to the total popula-
tion (denoted %∆ C
C+A+E
), and (ii) the percentage change in the ratio of the
elderly population to the total population (denoted %∆ E
C+A+E
). The second
set is simply the growth rate of the child population (C-Pop. Gr.) and the
growth rate of the elderly population (E-Pop. Gr.). The regression results
associated with including these additional variables in presented in Table 2.
In all the cases in Table 2 we include in addition to the rate of growth the
adult population, the initial level of output–per–adult, the average invest-
ment rate over the period and the two dummy variables for the Anglo-Saxon
countries and the Scandinavian countries. As can be seen from the table, the
inclusion of controls for changes in the age structure of the population does
not affect our previous observation regarding the effect of adult population
growth. Moreover, and somewhat surprisingly, we do not find the variables
capturing changes in the age structure to significantly affect any of the three
measures of economic performance in either the 1960–74 period or in the
1975–97 period. Hence, this suggests that the most important demographic
factor over this period is likely the change in the working age population.
In summary, results reported in Table 1 and in Table 2 suggest that some-
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thing quite radical has happened over period 1975–75 when compared to the
period 1960–74. In particular, since 1975, countries with low adult popula-
tion growth appear to have been able to increase output–per–adult at the
same rate as their higher population growth counterparts, while substantially
reducing their labor effort in comparison to the higher population growth
countries. Disregarding possible issues related to within–country equity, this
seems like a huge success for lower population growth economies relative to
higher population growth economies over this period. Our goal is therefore
to understand such successes. In particular, we will explore whether these
observations can be explained qualitatively and quantitatively within the
context of a simple neo–classical model where there is a common diffusion
of a new production process, but where the adoption of this new process is
endogenous and affected by the growth rate of the working age population.
III AModel of the Effects of Population Growth
During a Technological Transition
The results presented in Table 1 and 2 suggest that adult population growth
was more important in determining economic outcomes in the 1975–97 pe-
riod than in the period 1960–74. In light of neo–classical growth theory, it is
quite natural to ask whether such observations could simply be the reflection
of a technological change that has favored capital accumulation — i.e. has
been capital biased — and, accordingly, has been exploited more rapidly by
low population growth economies since such economies do not need to con-
stantly use their savings to simply equip new labor market entrants. This
is precisely the route that we will follow. To this end, we develop a simple
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growth model where technological change can take two different forms and
where households optimally determine their labor supply. We explicitly in-
clude a labor supply decision in the model since we want to examine whether
such a model can simultaneously explain the behavior of output–per–adult,
output–per–worker and employment–per–adult. Moreover, besides allowing
for labor–augmenting technological progress as in traditional growth theory,
we also allow a radical technological change to take the form of the arrival
and dissemination of alternative production process. In particular, we will
assume that the new technology exhibits less decreasing returns to capital
accumulation than the existing technology.9 Finally, note that we have cho-
sen to build our model such that it embeds the Solow growth model as a
particular case.
Technology
We consider an economy where there is one aggregate final output Yt which
is produced by competitive firms using a continuum of intermediate goods
indexed by i, i ∈ [0, 1] using a constant returns–to–scale technology repre-
sented by the following CES production function
Yt =
(∫
1
0
Y ρi,tdi
) 1
ρ
, 0 6 ρ 6 1 (1)
where Yi,t denotes the quantity of the intermediate good i used in the produc-
tion of the aggregate good. In each sector, there is again a set of competitive
firms, which can produce intermediate goods using a traditional production
process which depends on capital K and efficient units of unskilled labor θL
9Our model shares similarities with other models of endogenous technological adoption
such as those presented in Acemoglu (1998), Basu and Weil (1998), Beaudry and Green
(2001), Caselli (1999) and Zeira (1998).
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according to the following production function.
Yi,t = K
α
i,t(θtLi,t)
1−α, 0 < α < 1 (2)
Here again, Ki,t and Li,t respectively denote the amount of capital and em-
ployment used in each sector. Throughout, we will refer to capital generically
and interpret it as representing an aggregate of human and physical capital.10
In the above sectorial production function, we allow for technological change
through growth in θt which takes place at an exogenous and constant rate
of growth ν. However, we also want to incorporate into the model the pos-
sibility of a more radical technological change in the form of the arrival and
dissemination of a new production process. To this end, let i?t denote the
fraction of sectors, say i ∈ [0, i?t ], which can produce an intermediate good
using either the traditional production process given above, or instead can
use the following alternative production process which depends on the same
factors but exhibits less decreasing returns to capital
Y˜i,t = ΦK
β
i,t(θtLi,t)
1−β, 0 < α < β < 1 (3)
where Φ may be viewed as the relative total factor productivity of the new
technology. We interpret this alternative production process, or alternative
form of work organization, as a General Purpose Technology that over time
may become applicable to an increasing fractions of sectors. This increased
dissemination is then captured by increases in i?t . As already noted, our goal
with this model is to illustrate how a change in i?t — i.e. an increased dis-
semination of a new production process — can lead to different outcomes
10Since there is a large class of models where an explicitly modeling of human and
physical capital leads to a reduced form in which human and physical capital actually
act as an aggregate (see e.g. Barro Sala-i-Martin (1995), chapter 4), the approach is not
overly restrictive.
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across countries even if the dissemination is common to all countries. How-
ever, before examining such an issue, it is necessary to first discuss household
decisions.
Households
Households in our model control two decisions: a saving decision and a labor
supply decision. Our approach is to assume that households have bounded
rationality in the following sense. With regard to their savings decision,
households view the environment as sufficiently complex to be satisfied by
the simple rule of saving a constant fraction of output. Obviously, behavior
very close to this rule can be shown to be optimal in many different environ-
ments. However, we prefer here to simply impose such behavior, as is done
since Solow (1956) and in Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), and thereby
bypass the need to justify a particular structure for getting the same out-
come. Nonetheless, in the appendix we show a simple case with dynastic
linkages where optimizing behavior generates a constant saving rate. With
respect to labor supply decisions, we assume that households behave opti-
mally. Our justification for this asymmetric treatment of behavior is that,
given the savings decision, the labor supply decision is actually much simpler
since it is static and hence makes optimal decision making more likely. The
representative household’s static problem may then be stated as follows.
max
ct,lt
U(ct, lt) (4)
subject to
ct = (1− s)yt = (1− s)(wtlt + rtkt) (5)
And the dynamics of capital are given by
(1 + η)(1 + ν)kt+1 = syt + (1− δ)kt (6)
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where ct, lt, kt, yt represent respectively — in per capita terms — consump-
tion, labor supply, capital and income, η denotes the rate of population
growth, s the exogenous rate of savings, ν is the growth rate of θ and δ is the
rate of capital depreciation. Since we want labor–augmenting technological
change to generate balanced growth, we assume the households preferences
are represented by
U(ct, lt) = log(ct) +
ψ
1− γ
(1− lt)
1−γ (7)
As is well–known from the business cycle literature, these preferences assure
that employment remains constant along a balanced growth path generated
by labor augmenting technological change.11 We share the common view
that balanced growth is likely the norm, and find it important to maintain
the possibility of balanced growth in our model. Accordingly, we regard the
possibility of non–balanced growth induced by the arrival of a new production
process, as we allow here, as relevant for infrequent (but possibly important)
episodes associated with structural change.
A Walrasian Equilibrium in this setting is a sequence of prices and allo-
cations, such that given prices, allocation maximizes profits (when taking
technological choice into account) and maximizes utility (subject the savings
behavior), and all markets clear.
11It should be noted that all our results generalize to the case where preferences are
quasi–concave and of the form U(c, 1 − l) = c
1−σ
1−σ v(1 − l), 0 < σ 6= 1, that is, our results
can be generalized to the entire case of preferences consistent with balanced growth.
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IV Equilibrium Analysis
We now examine the extent to which the Walrasian Equilibrium of the model
developed in the previous section can help explain the set of observations dis-
cussed in section II. We will begin by a qualitative analysis which focuses
on steady state properties of the model. A quantitative analysis which takes
account of transitional dynamics will then supplement it and give some in-
sights about the empirical relevance of our model. Our aim is clarify the
reasons why economic performance across countries with different rates of
growth in working age population may diverge considerably when there is
the arrival and dissemination of a new production process. In particular, we
want to show that the dissemination of such a technology can cause the be-
havior of output–per–adult, output–per–worker and employment–per–adult
to exhibit the features described in section II. It should be immediately
emphasized that in our model population growth affects economic outcomes
through a mechanism well known in neo–classical growth theory: population
growth reduces the steady state capital–labor ratio because equipping new
labor market entrants acts as a drag on capital accumulation.
Qualitative Analysis
To have a base of comparison, it is useful to first recall how countries with
different rates of adult population growth would react in our model to a one
time change in θ, or alternatively to a one time shift up in its growth path of θ
— i.e. not a change in its growth rate.12 As can be easily verified, a one time
shift up in the growth path of θ causes steady–state output in our model to
12We consider a one time change in θ, since we will compare it with a one time change
in i?.
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grow by the same proportion independently of the rate of population growth,
and it leaves the employment rates unaffected. Hence, it is fair to say that in
our model — as is the case in the Solow growth model — a country’s long run
adjustment to a one time change in labor augmenting technological progress
is independent of its rate of population growth. However, as indicated in the
next two propositions, this is not the case for a change in i?. In our model,
when technological change takes the form of an increased dissemination of
an alternative production process, a country’s adjustment depends inherently
on its rate of growth of the working age population.
Proposition 1 An increase in i? will cause the relationship between the
steady state value of y
l
the rate of population growth to become more neg-
ative.
Proposition 113 addresses how population growth and technological dissemi-
nation interact in our model to determine y/l. Otherwise stated, an increase
in i? increases the semi–elasticity of steady state y/l with respect to η.14
When viewed in this way, the proposition offers a comparative static which
can be checked against our observations on output–per–worker. However,
to make such a comparison, we need to be willing to infer steady state im-
plications from the empirical results from Table 1. More precisely, such
steady state implications of population growth can be readily inferred from
13Propositions 1 and 2 are readily derived from the steady state conditions of the model.
However, in order to save space, the proof of Proposition 1 and 2 are omitted from the
paper but are available from the authors upon request.
14The exercise performed is to first consider the relationship between steady state out-
comes and population growth for the case where i? = 0. Denote this relationship as
z(η, i? = 0), where z is the log of y/l. Then consider the relationship between steady state
outcomes and population growth for the case where i? > 0, and denote this relationship
as z(η, i? > 0). The proposition tells us that ∂z(η,i
?>0)
η
≥ ∂z(η,i
?=0)
η
for all η
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these empirical results by multiplying the estimated effects of population
growth by the inverse of the speed of convergence. With this interpretation
in mind, proposition 1 indicates that the observed increased importance of
population growth on long–run output–per–worker may be the result of the
arrival and dissemination of an accumulation–biased technology during the
period 1975–97. Proposition 2 follows–up on proposition 1 by examining the
model’s implication for the sensitivity of the employment rate with respect
to population growth.
Proposition 2 An increase in i? (starting from i? = 0) causes the emergence
of a positive association between the steady state rate of employment (l/n)
and the economy’s rate of population growth.
Proposition 2 further illustrates that the observations highlighted in section
II are the type of effects one should expect if, during the 1975–97 period,
there has been the arrival and dissemination of new means of production
which favors accumulable factors. In particular, it offers an explanation to
the emergence of employment rate differences across industrialized countries
which departs quite radically from the dominant view whereby it is predom-
inantly institutionally driven. The explanation the model suggests is that
countries with lower rates of population growth have taken greater advan-
tage of new opportunities offered by capital deepening, since they have not
needed to use as much of their savings to equip new labor market entrants.
Accordingly, they have taken some of the gains associated with this change
in terms of decreased labor supply.15 The fact that proposition 2 indicates
that a technological change can affect steady state employment–per–adult
15Some readers may immediately object to such an interpretation claiming that it is
increased unemployment and not increased leisure that characterizes low employment rate
18
may appear surprising given that the class of preferences we assume implies
that long run labor supply is invariant to labor augmenting technological
progress. However, it is precisely because of this property that labor supply
will be affected by a radical technological change. One way to see this is
to note that labor supply is a function of the fraction of income derived by
capital. Since this fraction increases in our model as an economy adopts
the new technology, long run labor supply will decrease. In other words,
the increased capital intensity allowed by the arrival of the new technology
causes a particularly strong wealth effect in low population growth economies
which is not offset by a sufficiently strong substitution effect. In contrast, the
strength of the wealth effect is reduced in high population growth economies
since capital deepening is less pronounced.
In order to complete the picture described in section II, we need to ask
whether our model could also generate the pattern we observed for output–
per–capita: Can an increase in i? cause an increase in the sensitivity (semi–
elasticity) of y/θl with respect to η while simultaneously not causing an
increase in the sensitivity of y/θ with respect to η? The answer to this ques-
tion is clearly positive due to the offsetting effects described in propositions
1 and 2. In fact, an increase in i? in our model can be associated with either
an increase or a decrease in the sensitivity of y with respect to η. The only
restrictions imposed by the model on this relationship are (i) that the effect
of population growth on output–per–adult be non–positive and (ii) that it
be no greater in magnitude than that observed for output–per–worker.
countries. However, it can be easily verified that much of the differences in workloads across
industrial countries are due to differences in participation rates and differences in hours
worked–per–employed worked. This is not to say that unemployment is unimportant.
Instead, it is meant to point out that there are important differences in employment rates
across countries that are not simply reflections of unemployment rate differences.
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— Figure 1 About Here —
To help visualize the extent to which i? > 0 can cause the steady state
behavior of y (output-per-adult) and y/l (output-per-worker) to diverge, both
within and across economies, we have graphed both y/θl and y/θ as a function
of k/θ in Figure 1. Furthermore, we superimpose the steady state condition
between y/θ and k/θ, given by
y
θ
=
(1 + η)(1 + ν)− (1− δ)
s
k
θ
(8)
The relationships relating (y/θl) and (y/θ) with (k/θ) are different due to the
endogenous labor supply decision. The figure is drawn for the special case
where γ = 0, that is, the case where leisure enters utility linearly. Although
this is an extreme case, its clear implications make it perfect for illustra-
tion. Note that there is a minimal level of capital–per–adult before which
the presence of the alternative technology will have an effect and hence, in
this region, (y/θl) and (y/θ) behave identically. This minimum level of effec-
tive capital–per–adult is denoted (k/θ)m. Once beyond (k/θ)m, the behavior
of (y/θl) and (y/θ) diverge. In particular, until we reach (kθ)s, (y/θl) in-
creases in a convex fashion while (y/θ) remains constant. The level (k/θ)s
corresponds precisely to the level of capital–per–adult which assures that all
sectors i ≤ i? have fully adopted the more capital intensive technology. When
capital intensity moves beyond (k/θ)s, output–per–capita starts increasing
anew.
The points (k/θ)η0 ,(y/θ)η0 and (y/θl)η0 on the graph correspond to the steady
state levels for an economy with population growth η0. Using the steady state
relationship between (y/θ) and (k/θ), we can easily conduct comparative
static exercise for η around η0. In particular, a reduction in population
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growth corresponds to a flattening of the steady state relationship and hence
an increase in (k/θ). The interesting aspect is to note that the reduction
in population growth will be associated in the steady state with an increase
in labor productivity but no change in output–per–capita. Moreover, the
change in labor productivity due to the change in population growth will be
much larger in this case that what would have been observed if i? = 0. In
this respect, Figure 1 captures most of the content of our qualitative exercise.
Quantitative Analysis
Our theoretical analysis suggests that the patterns highlighted in section II
may reflect the interaction between adult population growth and the dis-
semination of a new production process. Our main objective in this section
is to explore the plausibility of this explanation by examining whether our
model, once quantified, can in effect reproduce the type of regressions we
presented in the empirical part. To this end, we begin by parameterizing our
model, estimating the unknown parameters and then evaluating whether it
can reasonably reproduce the regression results.
Since the model is to be evaluated on quantitative grounds, we have to specify
functional forms for the utility function. We therefore assumed that it takes
the following form
U(c, l) = log(c)− ψl (9)
thereby imposing γ = 0.16 Note that the parameter ψ is essentially irrelevant
for our purpose as it provides no information on the relationship between
rates of growth. Therefore, we calibrate it such that in the 1960–74 steady
16We conducted the estimation trying different values for γ, which did not yield signi-
ficative differences in the results.
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state, employment is normalized to 1. The parameter ρ ruling the elasticity
of substitution between intermediate goods in the production of the final
good is set to 1, as we did not find any major implication of this parameter
on our results. The parameter Φ is first set to a value such that in 1975, the
US economy would be indifferent between using the old or the new means of
production.17 Then, to start the adoption process, we increase Φ by a factor
of (1+ϕ) and assume that the new technology becomes available in all sector
(that is, i? = 1).
In the lines of Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), the depreciation rate, δ, is set
at an annual rate of 6%. The rate of growth of the exogenous technological
progress, ν, is set at 2.5% per year, which implies a rate of growth of total
factor productivity between 1 and 1.5% per year. The saving rate, assumed
to be identical across all countries, is set at 20%. The other parameters,
Θ = {α, β, ϕ} are estimated.
Our estimation strategy is based on a moment estimation method. The vector
of parameters Θ is obtained in order to minimize the discrepancy between a
set of moments obtained from the data and those obtained using the model.
We therefore select the deep parameters of the model in order to replicate the
set of regressions reported in section II for output–per–capita and output–
per–worker.18 More specifically, α is selected such that the model, when
simulated on the 1960–1974 period, minimizes the discrepancy between the
17This implies a initial value of Φ given by
Φ =
(
α
β
)β (
1− α
1− β
)1−β (
kUS,1975
lUS,1975
)α−β
18The employment–per–capita regression may then be trivially obtained from the first
two regressions.
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regression displayed in column 1 of panel A in Table 1 and the same regression
using data obtained from the model simulation. β and ϕ are set such that
the model, when simulated on the 1975–1997 period, replicates as close as
possible the regression displayed in column 1 and 3 of panel B in Table
1. Hence, our world economy will consist of the 18 countries (N = 18)
considered in the empirical study (see section II). The initial distribution
of revenues — in terms of output–per–capita — and labor force growth —
{ηi; i = 1 . . . , N} — are taken from the data. Table 3 reports the results.
19
Table 3: Estimation results
α β ϕ
0.513199 0.789095 0.242384
As indicated in Table 3, we obtain a value for α of 0.513199 when trying
to replicate the observations over the 1960–74 period assuming i? = 0. In
order to see the fit of the model over this early period, Table 4 compares
the regressions results implied by the model when α = 0.513199 with those
observed for output–per–adult prior of 1975. As can be seen in this table,
with i? = 0 (which corresponds to the standard Solow growth model) the
model is capable of replicating almost exactly the effect of population growth
on the rate of growth of output–per–adult. Note that in this case (when
i? = 0), the model does not generate any differences across countries in
employment rates and therefore the predictions of the model for the behavior
19For the 1960–1974 experiment, capital is assumed to be in steady state in 1960 in the
US economy. The stock of physical capital in the other economies are obtained from the
income distribution in 1960 and using the production function as
ki,1960 = kUS,1960 ×
(
yi,1960
yUS,1960
) 1
α
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of output-per-worker are identical as those for output–per–adult.
Table 4: Goodness of fit: 1960–1975 (∆(Y/N) regression)
Data Model
η -0.205 -0.205
(Y/N)0 -0.037 -0.042
R2 0.84 0.99
The second important observation to take from Table 3 is that our esti-
mate of β, which governs the importance of accumulable factors in the new
technology, is 0.78. Since our estimate of β is higher than that for α, this
provides initial support for the view that the patterns highlighted in the em-
pirical section may reflect the arrival of new means of production that exhibit
less diminishing returns to factors that can be accumulated.20 In order to
gauge the empirical relevance of the model, Table 5 compares the regres-
sion coefficients obtained from the data and those implied by the model for
the 1975–1997 period. As can be seen from this table, the model replicates
remarkably well the population growth effects for all three measures of eco-
nomic performance. The model can also account for the convergence process
in terms of output–per–adult, but slightly underestimate the speed of conver-
gence for output–per–worker. Consequently, the model tends to overestimate
the speed of convergence for employment–per–adult. However, in both these
latter cases, the model’s predicted speeds of convergence are well within the
estimated confidence intervals for their empirical counterparts. This set of re-
sults therefore indicates that the interaction between population growth and
the dissemination of a new means of production can quantitatively account
for the type of changing pattern we observed in section II.
20Note that this result was obtained without imposing β > α during the estimation.
24
Table 5: Goodness of fit: 1975–1997
∆(Y/N) ∆(Y/L) ∆(L/N)
Data Model Data Model Data Model
η -0.363 -0.362 -0.989 -0.989 0.617 0.626
(Y/N)0 -0.023 -0.019 -0.019 -0.011 -0.003 -0.010
R2 0.41 0.62 0.50 0.83 0.31 0.36
In order to illustrate the mechanisms at work in the model, Figure 2 reports
the dynamics of output per adult and output per worker for two different
economies as they gradually adopt the new technology. The first economy
we consider is representative of a low population growth economy as we
set its population growth to zero — i.e. η = 0. The second economy is
representative of a high population growth economy as we set η = 2%.
— Figure 2 About Here —
The upper–left panel of the figure reports the dynamics of output–per–capita
— expressed in logarithm and normalized to 1 in the initial period — for both
economies. We start the economies below their steady states and introduce
the new technology such that initially it is not used. The upper–right panel
corresponds to the same experiment but now follows the dynamics of output–
per–worker — also expressed in logarithm and normalized to 1 in the initial
period. As can be seen from the graphs, in the earlier periods of the dynamics,
both output–per–capita and output–per–worker evolve along the same path
in both economies. But after 3 periods of time, the constant population
economy starts adopting the new technology. This capital deepening allows
this economy to gain in terms of labor productivity and simultaneously reduce
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its work effort, keeping output–per–capita constant. In contrast, the growing
population economy has to wait 2 additional periods before starting this
process. This translates into divergent behavior in labor productivity that
can be read on the upper–right panel of the graph. This is also confirmed by
the lower–left panel of the graph that reports the log–difference of output–
per–capita (and output–per–worker) between the two economies.21 As soon
as an economy reaches the capital–labor ratio required to begin to profitably
implement the new technology, output–per–worker and output–per–capita
exhibit totally different dynamics. Indeed, as can be seen from the lower–
left panel of the graph, the differences between the two economies reduces
to zero in terms of output–per–capita during the adoption phase, while this
difference is magnified in terms of output–per–worker. Note that it is this
difference which explains why the model can account for the type of empirical
regressions we obtained in section II. As a last information, we report in the
lower–right panel of Figure 2, the capital share implied by the model. Recall
that the capital share here is meant to represent the combined share of both
human and physical capital. The implications of the dissemination of the
new technology is again seen to be quite large in this type of model, as the
capital share can differ between countries by an amount of 10 percentage
points during the transition phase.
21This difference is computed as
log
(
xη=0t /x
η=0
0
)
− log
(
xη=0.02t /x
η=0.02
0
)
for x denoting alternatively output–per–capita and output–per–worker.
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V Conclusion
Over the last quarter of the XXth century, economic performance across
major industrialized countries have differed considerably, both in terms of
output–per–worker and employment–per–capita. More to the point, we have
presented empirical evidence suggesting an important change in nature of
the relationships between economic outcomes and the dynamics of popula-
tion over the period 1975–97 versus the period 1960–1975. The object of
this paper has been to use these observations to shed light on both the na-
ture of recent technological change and on the reasons for why countries
have adjusted differently to these changes. To this end, we have extended a
Solow–type growth model in two directions. First, we introduced the pos-
sibility of radical technological change in the form of the dissemination of
an alternative means of production which displays less diminishing returns
to factors that can be accumulated. Secondly, we endowed households with
neo–classical preferences between consumption and leisure. We then used the
model to illustrate why a major technological change, when arriving in the
form of an alternative production process, can lead countries to adjust differ-
ently simply due to differences in rates of population growth. We have shown
that the model can explain both the qualitative features of the data as well
as quantitatively replicate the observed changes in importance of population
growth in the cross-country regressions. We therefore believe that differences
in adult population growth, due to is interaction with a major technological
change, may be an important (and previously neglected) element for un-
derstanding the differential economic experiences of industrialized countries
since the mid–seventies.
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A A Dynastic version of the model
In this section, we consider a dynastic version of the model that rationalizes
the constant savings rate assumption used in the text.
Individual behaviors
In each and every period t, a cohort of size Nt of new household is born. The
size of each cohort is assumed to evolve as
Nt = (1 + η)Nt−1 with η > 0 (A.1)
Each household lives for one period. The individual takes decisions on labor
and consumption/savings plans, with savings directed as a bequest towards
the next generation. Preferences are represented by a utility function of the
form
u(ct, ht, bt+1) = log(ct) + v(`t) + ρ log(bt+1) (A.2)
where ct, `t and bt+1 respectively denote consumption, leisure and the bequest
left to the next generation. ρ > 0 is the weight attached to the bequest
motive. v(.) is an increasing and concave function that takes the form
v(`t) =


ψ
1− γ
(`1−γt − 1) if γ ∈ R+\{1}
ψ log(`t) if γ = 1
(A.3)
At the begin of a period, each household receives their share of bequests left
by previous generation, bt
1+η
, and supplies her labor ht on the labor market
at rate wt. These revenues from productive market activities are then used
to purchase consumption goods, ct and saves an amount st. Therefore she
faces a budget constraint of the form
ct +
bt+1
1 + rt+1
= wtht +
bt
1 + η
(A.4)
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Furthermore, the households is endowed with one unit of time. Maximizing
the utility function with respect to ct, `t = 1− ht and bt+1, subject to (A.4),
yields the following labor supply behavior
v′(1− ht) =
wt
ct
(A.5)
and the following decision rules for consumption, ct, and the bequest, bt+1
ct =
1
1 + ρ
(
wtht +
bt
1 + η
)
(A.6)
bt+1 =
ρ(1 + rt+1)
1 + ρ
(
wtht +
bt
1 + η
)
(A.7)
We finally obtain savings as
st = wtht +
bt
1 + η
− ct =
ρ
1 + ρ
(
wtht +
bt
1 + η
)
(A.8)
Closing the model
Noting that next period’s capital stock corresponds to total savings in this
economy, we have that
Kt+1 = Ntst =
ρ
1 + ρ
(
wtNtht +Nt
bt
1 + η
)
=
1
1 + ρ
(wtLt +Nt−1bt) (A.9)
Furthermore, since all savings is in the form of bequests
Ntbt+1 = Nt(1 + rt+1)st = (1 + rt+1)Kt+1 (A.10)
and hence
Kt+1 =
ρ
1 + ρ
(wtLt + (1 + rt)Kt) (A.11)
Assuming factors are paid their marginal product and the technology satisfies
constant returns to scale, we have
Kt+1 =
ρ
1 + ρ
(Yt + (1− δ)Kt) = sYt + µKt (A.12)
Hence the law of motion of capital is essentially the same as the one the text,
and therefore all our propositions apply to this dynastic version of the model.
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